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6	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
7	DISTRICT OF NEVADA
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9	MIGUEL ALEJANDRO)
10	MARTINEZ,
11	Petitioner, 3:12-cv-00485-LRH-WGC
12	vs.) ORDER
13	JAMES GREG COX, et al.,
14	Respondents.)
15	Petitioner Miguel Alejandro Martinez has submitted a petition for writ of habeas corpus, pursuant
16	to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He has now filed a completed application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF #6),
17	which is granted.
18	The court ordered petitioner to file an amended caption page naming his immediate custodian
19	as a respondent (ECF #4). Plaintiff filed what he styled a motion for amended caption page and
20	indicated that he included High Desert State Prison Warden Dwight Neven as a respondent (ECF #5).
21	The court deems this sufficient; the Clerk of Court is directed to add Dwight Neven as a respondent in
22	this action.
23	Next, it appears that this petition may be subject to dismissal without prejudice for failure to
24	exhaust state remedies. A federal court will not grant a state prisoner's petition for habeas relief until
25	the prisoner has exhausted his available state remedies for all claims raised. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S.
26	509 (1982); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). A petitioner must give the state courts a fair opportunity to act on each
27	of his claims before he presents those claims in a federal habeas petition. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526
28	U.S. 838, 844 (1999); see also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995). A claim remains

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unexhausted until the petitioner has given the highest available state court the opportunity to consider the claim through direct appeal or state collateral review proceedings. See Casev v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 916 (9th Cir. 2004); Garrison v. McCarthey, 653 F.2d 374, 376 (9th Cir. 1981).

A habeas petitioner must "present the state courts with the same claim he urges upon the federal court." Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971). The federal constitutional implications of a claim, not just issues of state law, must have been raised in the state court to achieve exhaustion. Ybarra v. Sumner, 678 F. Supp. 1480, 1481 (D. Nev. 1988) (citing *Picard*, 404 U.S. at 276)). To achieve exhaustion, the state court must be "alerted to the fact that the prisoner [is] asserting claims under the United States Constitution" and given the opportunity to correct alleged violations of the prisoner's federal rights. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); see Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999). It is well settled that 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) "provides a simple and clear instruction to potential litigants: before you bring any claims to federal court, be sure that you first have taken each one to state court." Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 520 (1982)). "[G]eneral appeals to broad constitutional principles, such as due process, equal protection, and the right to a fair trial, are insufficient to establish exhaustion." Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). However, citation to state caselaw that applies federal constitutional principles will suffice. Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

A claim is not exhausted unless the petitioner has presented to the state court the same operative facts and legal theory upon which his federal habeas claim is based. Bland v. California Dept. Of Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469, 1473 (9th Cir. 1994). The exhaustion requirement is not met when the petitioner presents to the federal court facts or evidence which place the claim in a significantly different posture than it was in the state courts, or where different facts are presented at the federal level to support the same theory. See Nevius v. Sumner, 852 F.2d 463, 470 (9th Cir. 1988); Pappageorge v. Sumner, 688 F.2d 1294, 1295 (9th Cir. 1982); Johnstone v. Wolff, 582 F. Supp. 455, 458 (D. Nev. 1984).

Here, petitioner appears to challenge the calculation of his sentence (see ECF #1-1). However, he indicates on the face of his petition that he has not filed a direct appeal, nor a state postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Accordingly, petitioner shall have thirty (30) days from the entry

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